Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill by Editors,
NOTES
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
I. INTRODUCTION
Mental illness has become one of the greatest health problems facing
the country today. Some startling statistics have shown the seriousness of
the situation: over seven hundred and fifty thousand mentally ill patients
are in hospitals on any given day and almost one-half of all the hospital
beds in the nation are occupied by mental patients. The direct cost of
mental illness to the taxpayers is over a billion dollars a year. It is esti-
mated that one out of every twelve persons will spend a portion of his life
in a mental institution, and about nine million people suffer from serious
mental disorders.'
With this widespread recognition of the problem, action has been in-
stituted on many levels in order to devise adequate methods for the treat-
ment and cure of mental illness. The federal government has held hearings
and made grants to study the field.2 States are trying to expand their
present mental health programs, and there are also many private and
charitable groups interested in this area. The field has also become in-
creasingly important to the legal profession because most mental patients
are kept in institutions involuntarily and through legal sanction.3 The
American Bar Association has sponsored a comprehensive survey of the law
of mental illness 4 and there have been a number of articles written in
various legal periodicals.5 However, the medical and legal thought on the
position of legislation in this area has not been in accord. The medical
profession insists that the laws contain as few formalities as possible, argu-
ing that commitment is a medical problem and that excessive legal formality
is harmful to the well-being of the patient. The legal profession, recogniz-
ing this argument, still insists that there be adequate safeguards in order
to protect the individual's liberties. The purpose of this Note is to examine
the problem of commitment to and discharge from mental institutions of
people not charged with any crime. This will be done by examining the
1. Hearings on H-R. 3458 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
2. Ibid; Hearings on H.R. 2710 Before a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
3. Kitterie, Justice for the Mentally II, 41 J. Amd. JuD. Soc'y 46 (1957).
4. Report of the Special Committee on, the Rights of the Mentally Ill, 82 A.B.A.
REP. 356 (1957).
5. E.g., Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. RFV. 274 (1953);
Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient, 53 MicH. L. REv. 353 (1953);
Comment, Civil Insanity, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 76 (1958).
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existing laws and their actual application in order to discover whether they
are adequate to satisfy both medical necessity and constitutional require-
ments. In order to facilitate this study, investigation and analysis have been
concentrated on the laws presently in force in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.6 The peculiar significance of this jurisdiction is that its
mental health code is quite similar to A Draft Act Governing Hospitaliza-
tion of the Mentally Ill which was suggested by the National Institute of
Mental Health as a model code several years ago.
7
II. GENERAL HISTORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAws
Rise of Institutions and Mental Hospitals
"In the eighteenth century, miadmen were locked up in inadhouses; in the
nineteenth century, hatics were sent to asylums; and in the twentieth century,
the mentally ill receive treatment in hospitals." 8
At common law the state was vested with the right to restrain a men-
tally ill person against his will without legal process whenever such
action was necessary to prevent personal or property damage.9 A person
thus restrained would be put in a jail, poorhouse, pen or other secure
place.10
The rise of institutions for the insane came about slowly. The first
hospital in America to which the mentally ill were admitted was the Penn-
sylvania Hospital. This was the country's first general hospital and was
founded in 1756.11 The first institution exclusively for patients suffering
from mental illness was an asylum established in Williamsburg, Virginia in
1773.12 It was the only state institution of its kind for over half a century.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, hospitals were established by
6. Although the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act contains provisions dealing with
"epileptics," "inebriates," and "mental defectives" this study will deal only with those
defined as "mentally ill." An "epileptic!' is defined as "any person who is or thought
to be suffering from a primary convulsive disorder or its equivalent manifestation."
An inebriate is "a person who is so habitually addicted to the use of alcoholic or
other intoxicating or narcotic substances as to be unable or unwilling to stop the
excessive use of such substances without help. The term shall include 'dipsomaniac,'
'drug addict,' and 'habitual drunkard.' " A "mental defective" is "a person who is
not mentally ill but whose mental development is so retarded that he has not acquired
enough self-control, judgment and discretion to manage himself and his affairs, and
for whose welfare or that of others care is necessary or advisable. The term shall
include 'feeble-minded,' 'moron,' 'idiot' and 'imbecile,' but shall not include 'mental
illness,' 'inebriate' and 'senile.'" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072 (1954).
7. NATIONAL INsTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A
DRAFr AcT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health
Service Pub. No. 51, rev. ed. 1952); Comment, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 512 (1951).
8. JoNEs, LUNACY, LAw, AND CONSCIENCE, 1744-1845 at ix (1955).
9. Comment, Atalysis of Legal and Medical Comiderations in Commitment of
the Mentally lll, 56 YALE L.J. 1185 (1947).
10. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN A.sunlcA 418-19 (1937).
11. Weihofen, Hospitalizing the Mentally I1, 50 Mica. L. R v. 837, 841 (1952).
12. Ibid.
1959]
670 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
fifteen other states.'8 These institutions were for the care of the indigent
insane but more diligence was used to determine their economic status than
their mental condition.14
At this time the conviction that mental illness was curable became
widespread. There came onto the scene a New England schoolteacher,
Dorothea Dix, who dedicated her life to the reformation of the care of
the insane.15 It was due much to her effort that all the states finally as-
sumed the duty to provide for the insane.
One must realize that the use made of institutions in the nineteenth
century was merely to keep the "insane" out of society. There was almost
no attempt made to impart any therapeutic care-all the available resources
were aimed at the custodial level.' 6 There was widespread use of such
devices as the strait jacket, chains, and even whippings; there was no
attempt at treatment.-7  These were prisons whose inmates only crime
was being ill.
Early Laws Dealing With the Insane
The earliest American laws dealing with the insane were concerned
with removing them from the community. The greatest fear was that
these "lunatics" would be a drain on the local economy, and there was a
belief that one colony or community would foist its unwanteds on another.
In 1699 Massachusetts passed a statute--"An Act for the Supressing and
Punishing of Rogues, Vagabonds, Common Beggars, and other Lewd,
Idle and Disorderly Persons; and also for setting the Poor to Work" 18_
which put the insane into the category in which thought of the times had
long classified them. Because of this attitude it is not surprising that
commitment of the insane to institutions could be readily accomplished under
these early laws. All that was necessary was the desire on the part of
the family to have the person in question "put away." 19 This was not only
confined to the private institutions, but it was the general rule for the
early state asylums.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, several events occurred
which caused most of the states to enact legislation governing commitment
procedures. The most significant of these events concerned Mrs. B. P.
Packard who had been confined to a mental institution in Illinois on the
petition of her husband. After three years in the institution, she procured
her release through a habeas corpus proceeding in which it was found
13. Lowery, Public Mental Health Agencies, State and National, 286 AwNALs
100 (1953).
14. Comment, supra note 9, at 1187.
15. Weihofen, supra note 11, at 842.
16. For a study of the changes wrought in mental hospitals, see GaEiNBLATT,
FRom CusToDIAL TO THERAPEUTIC PATIENT CARM IN MENTAL HosPrrALs (1955).
17. Ibid; Weihofen, supra note 11, at 842.
18. 1 Mass. Acts & Resolves 378 (1699).
19. Curran, supra note 5, at 275.
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that she had been the victim of her husband's plot to be rid of her.20 After
her release, she began a campaign to get laws passed which would protect
the innocent against being "railroaded" into mental institutions. Her
crusade together with several contemporary "expose" novels, the most
famous of which was Charles Reade's Hard Cash, were instrumental in
securing the passage of strict laws to govern the institutionalization of the
insane.2 '
For the most part, the laws enacted at this time placed a great empha-
sis on the judiciary. In order to protect against fraudulent commitments,
the legislation provided for what amounted to a criminal trial for anyone
"charged" with being insane. The jury trials which resulted were gen-
erally considered to be an inadequate method of determining the technical
question of insanity. Universally condemned by the medical profession,
they gradually fell into disrepute.P Recently there has been a trend away
from formal procedures, with only Texas still requiring a jury trial. In
some instances only certification by private physicians is necessary.
23
The History in Penitsylvania
As early as 1709 a proposal was made at a meeting of the Society of
Friends in Philadelphia to build a hospital for the mentally ill, but no action
was taken on it 2 4 The first public recognition of the problem of people
suffering with mental illness in Pennsylvania was in the "Poor Act of
1729." 2, This legislation provided that the Mayor of Philadelphia to-
gether with an alderman could compel any resident, who brought into the
city "old persons, infant, maimed, lunatick or any vagabond or vagrant
persons" who were likely to become public charges, to supply a sufficient
sum to ship the person so imported back to whence he came. As noted
earlier,2 6 this was in keeping with the general thought of the times and
was the recognized means of solving the problem which was presented
-an economic one.
In 1750 Benjamin Franklin proposed to a meeting of Philadelphians
the building of a "convenient house under one Inspection and in the hands
of skillful Practitioners . . . for persons disordered in their senses." 27
Here again it appears that his proposal never got beyond the discussion
stage.
20. Deutsch, supra note 10, at 424.
21. Curran, supra note 5, at 276.
22. Ibid. It is interesting to note that Illinois, which was the center of Mrs.
Packard's campaign, found that there were more commitments by jury trials than
by previous procedures. Dewey, The Jury Law for Commitment of the Insaie in
Illiwis, 69 Am. J. OF INSANITY 571 (1913).
23. For a survey of the laws as they exist, see DINTmAR, INSANITY LAWS (1952).
24. PENNSYLVANIA MENTAL HEALTH, INc., MENTAL HEALTH, A BLUEPRINT FOR
PENNSYLVANIA 21 (1957).
25. 4 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 164 (1897).
26. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
27. PENNSYLVANIA MENTAL HEALTH, INC., op. cit. supra note 24, at 21.
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The constitution of the Commonwealth of 1790 invested the supreme
court and the courts of common pleas with the power to care for the
persons and estates of those who were non compos mentis, in addition
to all the powers formerly exercised in chancery.2 8 This had the effect
of importing the English law on the subject. In 1836 the legislature
enacted a law governing the determination of "Lunatics and Habitual
Drunkards." 29 This was the first legislation in the state which provided
that upon the application of a blood relative the court was to appoint a
commission of one or two persons 3 0 to inquire into the competency of a
party. However, it must be noted that while it gave the commission the
power to determine whether or not a person was a "lunatic," its main
purpose was to protect his real or personal property from being dissipated
and had no detailed provisions concerning the disposition of the person so
determined.31
In 1845 a bill was passed to establish the first state asylum.
82 It
provided that any person charged with a crime who was insane at the
time of commission of the crime and/or trial 'could be committed to this
institution by the court having jurisdiction. Also various officials in
charge of the poor could send any insane paupers within their care to the
institution. Under the commission's procedures which were established by
the prior 1836 act, any person could apply to a court having jurisdiction
for the purpose of having another determined insane, and if the person
was found to be "by reason of insanity, unsafe to be at large, or is suffering
any unnecessary duress or hardship, such court shall on the application
aforesaid, commit such insane person to said asylum." 33 This was one
of the first laws in the nation which recognized that a state hospital should
also provide care for the mentally ill who were not necessarily dangerous
to the community. The indigent insane were given precedence over "the
rich" 3 4 in order of admission.
The first law which outlined any detailed type of rules for com-
mitment was enacted in 1869.- This law provided that
"insane persons may be placed in a hospital for the insane by their
legal guardians, or by their relatives or friends in case they have no
guardians, but never without the certificate of two or more reputable
physicians, after a personal examination, made within one week of the
date thereof . .. ," 8
28. PA. CoNsr. art. V, § 6 (1790).
29. 1835-1836 Laws of Pa- 589.
30. Nothing was said as to the requirements for the members of the commissions
to have any special qualifications.
31. The court could at its discretion turn over the care and custody of the
individual to the commission.
32. 1845 Laws of Pa. 440.
33. Id. at 442 (§ 14).
34. Id. at 442 (§ 15).
35. 1869 Laws of Pa. 78.
36. Id. at 78 (§ 1).
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
Under another provision of this act, any judge could place a person in a
hospital. By this procedure application for the commitment had to be
made by any "respectable person." Then the judge was to appoint a
commission to inquire into the matter. The commission was to consist
of three persons, one of whom had to be a lawyer and one a physician. The
person against whom the application was made or his counsel had a right
to testify. If after ascertaining the facts, the commission was satisfied
that the person should be confined, then the judge could issue a warrant
and place him in a mental hospital.
This act also contained a provision that, if in an application made
by any "respectable person" 7 a patient was alleged to be unjustly con-
fined in an institution, the judge was to issue a writ of habeas corpus;
and at the hearing the onus of proving the alleged lunatic to be insane
was on those persons who were restraining him. A patient could also
be removed from any hospital, if someone offered to be responsible
for the insane person's expenses. It was declared a misdemeanor for any
official or employee of a hospital to interfere with or intercept any writ-
ten communication made by a patient to his counsel.
As will be discussed below, this legislation was the forerunner of the
current mental health laws. The next major enactment occurred in
1883 38 which spelled out in more detail the procedures governing com-
mitment and discharge. Also, for the first time there was a provision
governing the voluntary admission of patients to state hospitals. The
only other important change in the Pennsylvania law was made in the
1923 codification.3 9  All references to "insane", "lunatics" and "insanity'
were deleted and in their place "mental disease" and "mental illness"
were substituted.40
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA MENTAL HEALTH ACT OF 1951
In 1951 all the laws concerning mental health were collected and
codified under a single title.41 The purpose of this act was to make it
easier for the existing laws covering the entire problem of mental illness
to be amended; therefore it must be born in mind that this act is merely
a codification of prior existing law which had been enacted and amended
since 1836.4
37. This would seem to imply that the writ could not be brought by the inmate
himself; however, there was a further provision that nothing in the act was to
abrogate the prior existing right to the writ. Id. at 80 (§ 11).
38. 1883 Laws of Pa. 21.
39. 1923 Laws of Pa. 998.
40. Pennsylvania was the first state to modify its laws in this way. Comment,
mipra note 9, at 1200 n.107.
41. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 50, §§ 1071-1622 (1951).
42. See Statement of Senator Walker, who was one of the sponsors of the bill,
2 PA. LEGISLATVE J. 2023 (1951).
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Admission Procedures
Under the act, mental illness is defined as "an illness which so lessens
the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, judgment and
discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it
necessary or advisable for him to be under care." 43  A person falling
within this definition may be admitted to a mental institution in any one
of four ways: voluntarily, by temporary or emergency detention, by cer-
tification by two physicians, or by judicial commitment.
Voluntary Admission 44
Any person who believes himself to be mentally ill may make applica-
tion for admission in writing to a superintendent of any mental hospital.
The superintendent who receives the application then is to examine the
patient. If he finds that the applicant is of sufficient mental competence to
make the application and is in need of care, he may admit him to the
hospital. Any person who is so admitted cannot be detained for more
than ten days after he gives a written notice of his desire to leave the
institution. If the superintendent thinks that it would be inadvisable to
discharge the patient, he is to notify the person's relatives, friends or other
persons liable for his support. If these people favor release of the patient,
then the only way in which the superintendent can detain him is by means
of a judicial commitment.45
Temporary or Emergency Detention 4 6
An application may be made to any mental hospital by a relative,
guardian or friend of a person thought to be in need of immediate tem-
porary care. This application must be accompanied by the certificate
of any qualified physician.47 Upon receipt of these documents, a super-
intendent may receive the patient and detain him for a period of no more
than twenty-one days. During the detention period, the patient is to be
examined for purposes of determining further disposition. If after the
examination the superintendent is convinced that the patient does not need
the temporary care, he is to discharge him. If, on the other hand, he is
convinced that the patient is in need of more protracted treatment, he may
either admit the patient on a voluntary application or take the necessary
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(11) (1954).
44. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 50, §§ 1161-64 (1954).
45. Although there is a section of the act which states that discharge is in the
discretion of the superintendent (see note 60 infra), there is a specific clause which
states that "no person voluntarily admitted shall be detained for more than ten days
after he has given written notice . . . of his intention or desire to leave ... "
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1164(a) (1954).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 50, §§ 1184-85 (1954).
47. The certificate of the doctor in this instance need not be sworn to or affirmed.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184(b) (1954).
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steps to have the people who made the temporary application have the
patient committed by certificate or by order of a court.
Admission on the Certification of Two Physicians 48
Any person "who happens to be mentally ill or in such condition as to
need the care required by persons who are mentally ill" 49 may be admitted
against his will on the application of his relatives, friends, guardian or any
other responsible person together with a certificate of two "qualified phy-
sicians." 6o The application must be made within thirty days after the
examination made of the patient by the certifying physicians. These
physicians cannot be related to the patient or connected with the institu-
tion to which admission is sought. Upon this application, the patient
may be received and detained by the institution to which such application
is made.5 1 If any physician makes a sworn certificate falsely for pecuniary
reward he is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Judicial Commitment6
2
Here, for the first time in the act, the term "commitment" is used.
A petition may be made by any responsible person to any court having
jurisdiction to commit a person who is mentally ill, or who is thought
to be mentally ill and in need of observation, diagnosis and treatment.
The application must be accompanied by sworn statements of two quali-
fied physicians that such commitment is necessary and that the patient
has been examined by them within two weeks prior to the petition. Since
commitment might be immediately effected on this two physician certificate
as just discussed, it would seem that the only reason for resort to the more
rigorous judicial commitment would be that some relatives or friends
objected to the institutionalization sought. Inasmuch as such disputants
would be likely to institute immediate proceedings for habeas corpus,
5 3
judicial inquiry could not be avoided. After the petition is filed, the court
may appoint a commission to inquire into the facts of the case.5 4  This
commission is to be composed of three people, two qualified physicians55
and an attorney-at-law, with power to serve notices, 6 compel appearances
and hear evidence. Although the person alleged to be mentally ill is
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1181-82 (1954).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1181(a) (1) (1954).
50. See text and notes accompanying notes 82-83 infra.
51. Even though there is nothing in the act which provides the power to appre-
hend the individual and transport him to the institution after certification, it seems to
be a common practice. Interviews With Several Psychiatrists in Philadelphia, Oct.
& Nov. 1958.
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1201-03 (1954).
53. See text accompanying notes 62-63 infra.
54. There is no language in the act that would make the appointment of the
commission mandatory, but it does seem to be the general practice.
55. Again there is no need of any psychiatric training.
56. Nothing is said as to whom notice must be given.
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notified of the proceedings and has the opportunity to appear, it has been
held that it is discretionary with the commission as to whether it is neces-
sary to actually examine and question him. 57 Upon receipt of the report
of the commission, the court may hold a hearing with or without the person
sought to be committed present, and either make an order committing the
individual if it finds it necessary or discharge him. Any person who is
committed by the court to an institution for "observation, diagnosis and
treatment" must be so committed for a definite period not to exceed
ninety days.58  The superintendent of the hospital is required to make a
report to the court concerning the patient's condition during this period
after which the court shall either discharge him or make other disposition
for his care.
There is a further provision whereby any judge of a court, or a magis-
trate in Philadelphia, to whom it appears that a person should be committed,
can order his restraint in Philadelphia General Hospital or any state hos-
pital for examination.69 The period of such restraint is not to exceed six
hours prior to the examination and twenty-four hours thereafter.
Discharge and Release
Any superintendent or the trustees of a hospital may discharge a patient
if, in their opinion, "no harm" will arise from the action. They may not
peremptorily discharge a person who is thought to be homicidal or other-
wise dangerous.6 Any court which has committed a patient also has the
right to review his record and, if it feels that he is no longer in need of
further care, to order his discharge. 6'
One of the most confusing aspects presented by the 1951 codification
is that there are two separate provisions dealing with the right to a writ of
habeas corpus. The first one merely states that every commitment can be
appealed by writ of habeas corpus. 2 This would put the burden on the
person seeking the writ to prove that he is being detained illegally. The
other provision states that any patient or someone acting on his behalf
may petition for a writ and the burden of proving that the patient is in need
of further detention shall be on the persons responsible for his continued
hospitalization.6
Rights of Patients
The act has one section which deals with the personal rights which are
guaranteed to patients in mental hospitals.6 The inmates are to have the
57. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 21 Pa. Dist. 513 (C.P. 1911).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1206 (1954).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 50, § 1201 (d) (1954).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301 (1954). In order to discharge such a patient
they must give notice to the Department of Welfare.
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304 (1954).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1241 (1954).
63. PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 50, § 1482 (1954).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481 (1954).
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right to communicate with counsel and the court which committed them,
if any. Writing materials are to be furnished for communication with
any person outside of the institution at the discretion of the superintendent.
They are also entitled to religious freedom and opportunity to be visited
by physicians. Mechanical restraints can be placed on a person only if it is
deemed "to be for his medical needs." 6 The practical operation of these
provisions is discussed in a later section. 66
The Constitutionality of the Act
The generally accepted view is that procedural due process does not
require proceedings of a judicial nature; 6 7 however, it does require "that
there shall be a regular course of proceedings in which notice is given and
an opportunity afforded to defend against it." 68 There is no doubt that
the procedures outlined for judicial commitment satisfy these requirements,
since notice is given to the person sought to be committed and he has the
opportunity to appear before the court-appointed commission or the judge
even though his presence is not required. However, there is serious doubt
as to whether this is true of the procedures outlined in the act by which two
physicians may commit a person for an indefinite period.
The only time that the constitutionality of this type of commitment has
been expressly raised under the Pennsylvania act was in the case of
Hannwn v. Hill69 decided in 1915 by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania. In that case Hammon sought
a writ of habeas corpus from a mental hospital where he had been kept for
two years after two physicians certified that he was insane. He had sought
a writ of habeas corpus earlier, and at the hearing which resulted was
adjudged insane. 0 The relator in the subsequent case did not again raise
the issue of insanity, but argued that he was committed without due process
of law because he had not been given notice of a hearing or an opportunity
to defend against the original commitment and detention. The court held
that, since this act had not been declared unconstitutional by the courts
of Pennsylvania and the writ of habeas corpus is available to a patient, the
requirement of due process was satisfied.
71
In a case attacking a similar law in the District of Columbia, the court
of appeals in Barry v. Hall 72 held that this method of commitment was a
violation of due process. The court stated:
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481.1 (1954).
66. See text accompanying notes 80-96 infra.
67. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
68. Id. at 437.
69. 228 Fed. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
70. Id. at 1000.
71. Id. at 1002.
72. 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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"To treat such a writ of relief as a writ of original adjudication
would be to deny to one confined the very type of hearing, the absence
of which is the very basis of relief when a writ of habeas corpus is
directed to the invalidity of the original confinement, and would amount
to legal condonation of the initial introduction into a mental hospital
and confinement there without the statutory adjudication until the
time of the habeas corpus hearing." 73
The latest case to raise this question was State ex rel. Fuller v. Mul-
liWX, 74 decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1954. The Missouri
law in question required more in the way of formalities than the one in
Pennsylvania. It contained a provision that the certificates of the two
physicians must state that the person was mentally ill and "because of his
illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty." 75
It further provided for a hearing or appeal after commitment if demanded
by either the patient, guardian, or relative. The court, however, held that
the statute violated due process in denying the individual his right to a
hearing and notice before commitment. In deciding that a hearing on a
writ of habeas corpus was not sufficient, the court said:
"It will be seen that admission to a mental hospital under the non-
judicial procedures here attacked could always result in indeterminate
confinement. . . . This could be accomplished without the proposed
patient's knowledge that impairment of his mental condition was even
suspected. Then for want of subsequent action (however induced)
on the patient's part, or on his behalf, . . . such hospitalization might
conceivably continue for the remainder of the patient's life." 76
The Pennsylvania law only requires that in the opinion of the certifying
physicians "the patient is or thought to be mentally ill . . . or is in need
of and will be benefitted by care and the admission applied for." 77 There
is ample authority for the proposition that a person who is dangerous to
himself or others by reason of insanity may be restrained temporarily with-
out formal legal process.78 However, in the act as it now stands not only
is there no requirement of danger or potential harm, but the length of com-
mitment is indefinite and not for a fixed period such as might be required
by an emergency. There is no requirement that any notice be given to the
patient as to the reason for his examination (which is performed by the
certifying physicians) nor is the patient given any opportunity to defend.
73. Id. at 229.
74. 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
75. Id. at 863, 269 S.W.2d at 74.
76. Id. at 866, 269 S.W.2d at 76-77.
77. PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 50, § 1182 (a) (8) (1954).
78. See note 9 supra.
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The only opportunity for a hearing available to a person sought to be
committed under this procedure is after he has already been admitted to a
hospital. This can only be accomplished through the writ of habeas corpus.
To say that this writ is a substitute for an original adjudication would be
to condone deprivation of liberty at least up to the time a writ can be
issued. The argument most often advanced by proponents of the informal
procedure is that the confinement is only temporary and is necessitated
by the nature of the patient's illness.79 However, there is nothing in the
act which limits the application of this section to those cases in which
immediate action is required because of the patient's condition. Also, the
argument that the hospitalization is only temporary depends on the ability
of the patient to secure the writ, this being the only way in which a final
adjudication of sanity may be secured.
It is likely that were the question to arise again in Pennsylvania the
private commitment procedure would not survive constitutional attack. The
strength of the early Pennsylvania precedent of the Hammon case is sus-
pect not only in view of the more recent Barry and Fuller cases but also
because the court in Hammon was acting on the petition of a patient who
had actually been adjudged insane at a hearing on a prior writ.
Practical Application of the Act
After making several visits to state and city hospitals and interviewing
psychiatrists and officials, it became readily apparent that many abuses
could and sometimes do result under the Mental Health Act of 1951. In
the first place, of all admissions, both voluntary and involuntary, to the
state's eighteen public mental hospitals in the last year, over three-fourths
were made by the certification of two physicians without any judicial process
whatsoever.8 0 Although there were no statistics available, this percentage
is probably higher in regard to admissions to private institutions.81 It must
be pointed out that the act only requires the certification of two "qualified
physicians." 8 2 This means that any two medical or osteopathic doctors
who are licensed by the state and have practiced for over three years can
commit a person to a public or private institution for an indefinite period-
the length of time for which care is required. The possible abuse here is
quite apparent. A great many doctors, other than qualified psychiatrists,
have had little or no training or experience in the detection or care of mental
79. In re Rowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897). "The traumatic effects of
this procedure, which is intended to protect them, may require a great deal of care
and treatment to overcome." Curran, supra note 5, at 277. See also GRouP FOR THE
ADVANCM=T OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 4, at 2 (1948).
80. The total number of admissions to the hospitals for the year ending May 31,
1958 was 8,287. Of this total, 6,300 were by the standard nonjudicial method. Letter
From Robert P. Wray, Director of Program Research and Statistics, Department of
Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pa., to the University of Pennsylvania Law Reiew,
Nov. 4, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
81. Interviews With Several Psychiatrists in Philadelphia, Oct. & Nov. 1958.
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(13) (1954).
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illness. This is especially true of the older practitioners who attended
medical schools when little or no psychiatric training was given. It hardly
seems reasonable to invest these men with the power to deprive a person
of his liberty because of a determination which they might make in good
faith, but for which they have little qualification. While general practi-
tioners may have been the most desirable authorities in an earlier period,
there is no justification today for failure to demand examination by psy-
chiatrists whose training has been primarily directed toward mental
disease.s8
Most psychiatrists connected with state hospitals state that very few,
if any, people are ever falsely committed under this process.8 4 They usually
argue that the problem only exists in the motion pictures and novels. This
may be and probably is true as concerns state hospitals. However, the
possibility of this happening in the private hospitals is all too real. These
hospitals are licensed by the state and possess the same power to hold a
patient as those publicly operated. 5 One must keep in mind when con-
cerned with this problem that these institutions are not supported by state
funds and they depend on the fees received for the care and maintenance
of patients for their very existence. The subconscious desire on the part
of the staff would be quite strong to try to detain a patient who is not
seriously ill or who is a borderline case. Whenever a doubt as to a patient's
condition would arise, it would probably be resolved in favor of his further
detention. This is a situation which has arisen more than once.88
In Philadelphia there is a state-operated Reception Center which is the
only one of its kind in the state.8 7 Anybody may come to the Center for
diagnosis and out-patient treatment. It has approximately forty beds which
are to be used for the diagnosis of people in order to determine what
further disposition is necessary. Judges or magistrates may send people
to the Center for examination under the emergency commitment pro-
cedures in the act.88 However, personal investigation revealed a general
disregard for the letter of the law by the Center's staff in the admission
83. 'While physicians are better qualified to testify to a diseased condition than
are laymen, their testimony upon the subject of the mental capacity of an individual
whom they have been privileged to observe is not entitled to any greater weight than
that of a layman." Tyler v. Tyler, 401 Ill. 435, 82 N.E.2d 346 (1948). "The courts
in general assume that any physician is competent to testify on any topic in the field
of medicine. This is certainly unrealistic, especially with regard to psychiatry, in view
of the wholly inadequate training in psychiatry which until very recently was given
to medical students, and the general lack of interest of the medical profession in the
subject of mental disorder." Overholser, Psychiatric Expert Testimny, 42 J. Cam!.
L., C. & P.S. 283, 295 (1951).
84. Interview With Commissioner of Mental Health, City of Philadelphia, Nov. 4,
1958. This view was shared by a great many of the other psychiatrists interviewed.
85. The definition of "institution" in the act includes "any State or licensed place,
public or private, for the care of patients." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(8) (1954).
86. Interviews With Several Philadelphia Attorneys, Oct. & Nov. 1958, who told
of many experiences in securing the release of patients from private institutions.
87. Interview With Staff Psychiatrists, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Mental
Health Center, Oct. 24, 1958.
\88. See note 59 stipra.
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and detention of patients. According to the act the only patients who may
be held against their will are those who have been sent by the courts or
certified by physicians as outlined above. However, the general practice
is for police to pick up an individual who is creating a disturbance of some
kind and to bring him directly to the Center without first getting a magis-
trate's order.89 Further, the act provides that the Reception Center may
only hold a person against his will six hours prior to and twenty-four hours
after an examination. The length of stay for most patients who have been
admitted involuntarily, however, is two weeks and sometimes as long as
forty or fifty days.90 The questionable legalistic justification offered for
such a practice is that, although there is a maximum time for detention
before and after the examination, there is no maximum time fixed for the
length of examination.
Similarly, improper detention procedures were discovered to exist in
the psychiatric section of the Philadelphia General Hospital. This institu-
tion is city-operated, and its psychiatric section has over four hundred
beds. They take cases sent to them by either the courts or the Reception
Center together with those generally admitted.91 It was surprising to note
that, aside from those few patients who have been placed there by court
order, there are no commitment papers of any kind for the patients. The
usual procedure is to have the patient or his relatives sign a regular hospital
admission form. 2 The staff officials declare that they will not hold a person
against his will if a friend or relative seeks their release, except in those
cases where they think he is dangerous and formal commitment procedures
are warranted. However, it is doubtful if patients who are without friends
or relatives are accorded the same treatment. Staff officials state that
their main purpose is to treat those people who can be cured in a short time,
but some of their patients are kept as long as two years without any type
of commitment procedure.
Although it was stated earlier that very few if any people are falsely
committed to state institutions, another problem exists in these places which
tends to impair the rights of the individual. There are only a few of these
hospitals that are not grossly overcrowded. 93 Because of this situation
periodic examinations are not given and as a result many patients who have
become well and fit enough to be returned to society are kept there long
after their recovery.9 4
89. Interview With Staff Psychiatrist, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Mental
Health Center, Oct. 24, 1958.
90. Ibid.
91. Interview With Staff Psychiatrist, Philadelphia General Hospital, Oct 21,
1958.
92. Ibid.
93. In 1957 there were only three hospitals which were not overcrowded. How-
ever, in those that are, the overcrowding ranges from 11% to 707o. PENNSYLVANIA
MENTAL HEALTH, Ixc., MENTAL HEALTH, A BLUEPRINT FOR PENNSYLvANIA 14
(1957).
94. Interview With Psychiatrist, who was formerly on staff of Pennsylvania state
hospital, in Philadelphia, Nov. 4, 1958.
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The writ of habeas corpus does not seem to be readily available to
protect those who are not released when well or who are improperly com-
mitted. It has been estimated that there are no more than one or two
commitments a year to the state's eighteen mental hospitals which are
appealed by a writ of habeas corpus.9 5 The infrequency of appeal indicates
that this writ is not easy to procure by a patient in a mental hospital. If he
has no friends or relatives on the outside who would be willing to seek
his freedom, it would be almost impossible for a patient to obtain a lawyer
or even to get an independent psychiatrist to make an examination in order
to determine his condition. This is especially so since most lawyers or
doctors who receive communications from patients in mental institutions
have a tendency to discount their credibility.9 6
IV. RECO MENDATIONS FOR REVISION OF THE PRESENT MENTAL
HEALTii LAWS IN PENNSYLVANIA
No matter what might be said by psychiatrists, when a person is placed
in a mental institution against his will he is being deprived of his liberty.
Such a harsh procedure should only be justified when the physical safety
of the patient and the public would be protected by his institutionalization.
However, under the present law this is not the case. The following recom-
mendations are suggested in order to provide the medical profession with
the means to combat mental illness while at the same time affording the
individual the utmost protection of his civil liberties.
In the first place, there should be no involuntary commitments by any
process whatsoever unless the condition of the individual is such that "he
is a danger to himself or to others." There is no reason for a person to be
restrained in his personal liberty merely because he is "a proper subject
for care" 11 or "will be benefited by care" 98 or "is in need of observation,
diagnosis and treatment." 99 Just because a person's ailment is mental
rather than physical is no reason for the state to take away his freedom
unless it can be shown that by reason of his mental disorder he is a serious
threat to the safety of his person or to others.10° However, since psy-
chiatrists say that there can be no clear, concise definition of which mental
illnesses are dangerous, the act of necessity must be drafted in more general
terms, permitting involuntary commitment only of those persons who "by
reason of mental illness are dangerous to themselves or to others."
95. Letter From Robert P. Wray, supra note 80.
96. Interviews With Several Philadelphia Attorneys, Oct. & Nov. 1958.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1203(c) (1954).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1182(a) (8) (1954).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1201 (a) (2) (1954).
100. The only time that a state is permitted to restrain an individual's liberty is
when there is a threat to public safety. This has long been the view as regards the
state's right to quarantine an individual who is suffering from a communicable
disease which would endanger the health of the community. For a complete dis-
cussion of this field see 18 FLA. L.J. 13 (1944) ; 15 GA. B.J. 215 (1952).
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Secondly, there should be no involuntary commitments merely on the
certification of two physicians. In the place of this procedure, it is sug-
gested that each of the state's eighteen public mental hospitals set up a
reception center patterned after the one in Philadelphia. To these places
any licensed medical or osteopathic physician could send a person who is
in need of emergency care. The reception centers could then detain these
people for the purpose of examination for a period of not more than five
days. Such a time limit should afford reasonable opportunity for the staff
to perform their necessary diagnostic investigation 101 while not being
subject to interpretation as authority for almost indefinite detention-as has
been the case under the present vague standard of six hours prior to and
twenty-four hours after the examination. 10 2 If psychiatric examination
should indicate that further hospitalization is necessary for proper treatment,
the officials of the center could either encourage the patient to seek volun-
tary admission or, if he is dangerous to himself or to others, take the steps
necessary for formal involuntary commitment.
It is also recommended that the only way in which a person could
be committed involuntarily would be by the judicial process now in exist-
ence with some refinements. By this method a petition would be filed after
which the court must appoint a commission (as opposed to the existing
law which leaves the appointment to the discretion of the court103) con-
sisting of two psychiatrists and an attorney. This commission would hold
a hearing which could be informal in nature so as to protect the well-being
of the one sought to be committed. Not only should notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard be given the patient or his counsel or relatives, but a
personal examination of the patient by the commission should be required.
In this way neither juries nor medical doctors, neither of whom are qualified
to make a determination as to an individual's mental state, would have the
power to deprive a man of his liberty. Instead, the determination would be
made by those who are best qualified to do so. After the commission's
investigation a report of its finding together with any recommendation
should be filed with the court. The court then would have the power to
review only those findings which include a recommendation of hospitaliza-
tion; and, if the court finds an abuse of discretion, it would not be bound
to follow such a recommendation. In this way a person would be assured
of some form of hearing prior to his commitment.
Finally, in order to do away with the present difficulty of obtaining
a writ of habeas corpus, two things are recommended. Primarily, with the
above outlined procedure as regards formal involuntary commitment, the
commission which made the original finding as to the patient's hospitaliza-
101. The five-day period was suggested during interviews with officials and
psychiatrists in Philadelphia, Oct. & Nov. 1958, who stated that this would be the
most feasible time necessary to conduct a proper examination allowing for the situ-
ations when work may backlog.
102. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
103. See note 54 supra.
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tion should review the case of every such patient at least once a year.
This would insure that a complete examination is given each patient
periodically, and that some authority outside of the institution in which
he is kept is aware of his situation. Although this would entail great
administrative expense and burden, it seems fully justified. At the very
minimum, knowledge that an independent body is going to examine the
situation of the patients periodically would probably act as an inducement
for the hospitals to keep closer checks on their patients. An alternate pro-
cedure is that recommended by the English Commission which recently
studied English mental health laws.. 0 4  It proposed that there should be
an independent roving board of examiners who would periodically visit the
mental institutions, 0 5 especially those privately maintained, and hear the
case of any patient who desires such a hearing. This would afford a less
expensive means of providing patients who do not have anyone on the
outside desirous of their release with a forum in which to be heard.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mental Health Act was enacted in order to provide a single act
to govern commitment and treatment and thus to make amendment easier.
As was pointed out above, a number of defects are apparent as the act
now stands; but since 1951 no significant amendments have been adopted.
It is suggested that the time has come for a close reappraisal. If the recom-
mendations for a change in the definition of those people who may be
involuntarily committed, for involuntary commitment by judicial proceed-
ings only, and for more adequate provisions for review are followed, it
would be more difficult for people to be institutionalized against their will.
It might be argued that this would hamper the proper hospitalization, treat-
ment and cure of the mentally ill. However, this is not necessarily the
case. When a person is dangerous or an emergency occurs, commitment
can be accomplished immediately in an informal manner. By eliminating
informal processes of permanent commitment, practitioners would be
encouraged to have their patients seek voluntary admission to mental
hospitals. This in itself would be a desirable result since a person who has
placed himself in a hospital is more likely to respond to treatment. 0 6
H. J. J.
104. ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE LAW RELATING TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND
MENTAL DEFiCIENCY, 1954-1957, REPORT (1957).
105. Id. at 148-53.
106. This was the view expressed by practicing psychiatrists during interviews
in Philadelphia, Oct. & Nov. 1958.
THE KENNEDY-IVES BILL
THE KENNEDY-IVES BILL: AN ANALYSIS OF
SUGGESTED LABOR LEGISLATION
Problems involving internal union organization recently brought to
the forefront by the investigations and hearings of the McClellan Com-
mittee I have long been ignored as subjects of legislative regulation. While
the hearings centered mainly on the activities of five organizations,2 only a
segment of American unionism, the practices discovered were apparently
considered sufficiently widespread and indicative of a sufficiently serious
threat to the proper conduct of interstate commerce to bring forth dramatic
legislative response. The administration recommended specific legislation,
and a number of bills were introduced in Congress. One of these efforts,
the Kennedy-Ives Bill,3 passed the Senate by a vote of eighty-eight to one
and narrowly failed to attain a majority vote in the House. The official
title of the Kennedy-Ives Bill, "The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1958," is hardly suggestive of its extensive coverage.
The bill attempted to deal with a variety of distinct problems only some
of which involved reporting and disclosure by the labor organizations. In
other areas covered by the bill-elections, embezzlement of union funds,
union employment of persons with criminal records-specific governmental
regulation and administration were provided.
The significant success of the bill in the Senate together with announce-
ment of its support by organized labor itself 4 indicates that it or similar
1. The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Manage-
ment Field was set up pursuant to Senate Resolution 74 of the first session of the
85th Congress which authorized and directed the committee, "to conduct an investi-
gation and study of the extent to which criminal and other improper practices or
activities are, or have been, engaged in in the field of labor-management relations or in
groups or organizations of employees or employers, and to determine whether any
changes are required in the laws . . . in order to protect such interests against the
occurrence of such practices or activities." Interim Report of the Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S. Doc. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (hereinafter cited as Interim Report).
2. Testimony heard by the committee directly involved five unions: the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America; the Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union of America;
the United Textile Workers of America; the International Union of Operating En-
gineers; and the Allied Industrial Workers of America (formerly the United Auto-
mobile Workers, AFL). A number of other unions, including the building-trades
union and barbers, were also touched on. The committee also heard testimony con-
cerning various management consultants and employers. Ibid.
3. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) passed Senate, as amended, 104 CONG.
REc. 10381 (daily ed. June 17, 1958). House failed to suspend rules and pass. 104
CONG. REc. 16804 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1958).
4. While the bill was pending in the House Committee, the following telegram
was sent to congressional leaders: "Need for passage of effective legislation in fight
against corruption in labor-management relations is acute. Sincerely trust House
will pass Kennedy-Ives bill, S. 3974, under suspension of rules. It is only effective
measure now pending in Congress. Trust you will use your good offices to insure
such vote. George Meany." 104 CONG. REc. 16832 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1958). This
approval was given despite the amendments adopted on the Senate floor which, in
the opinion of the AFL-CIO "will prove unworkable; provisions which we know
are unwise; provisions which are clearly unfair and unduly repressive." 104 CONG.
Rzc. 16824 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1958).
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legislation is likely to be enacted by the 86th Congress. The purpose of
this Note is to analyze the provisions of the Kennedy-Ives Bill along with
other proposed legislation from the standpoint of an inquiry into the efficacy
of the provisions in view of their purported objectives.
I. BACKGROUND
A survey of prior state treatment of labor problems suggests that
local legislators have neither the desire nor the ability to deal with the
problems of internal union organization which gave rise to the Kennedy-
Ives Bill. Self-imposed limitations have prevented state courts from aiding
internal reform 5 and on the legislative level only a scattering of states
have enacted comprehensive labor laws dealing with unfair labor practices
and representation elections.6 -Statutes in other states are narrower in
scope,7 often dealing only with isolated problems such as excessive initiation
fees, election safeguards, and internal union business practices. Some of
these laws have been held unconstitutional by state courts as violative of
the federal or state constitutions. In AFL v. Mann 8 a Texas statute
requiring unions to submit a detailed annual financial report to state
officials was invalidated as being "an unwarranted and unreasonable re-
quirement, imposing undue burdens upon unions not demanded by the
public interest. . . ." 9 In Colorado the provisions of a statute requiring
union financial reports and regulating union elections were held to be "so
inseparably intertwined with and predicated upon the [compulsory union
incorporation requirement, itself unconstitutional as a prior restraint on
picketing] as to be unable to stand without it." 10 Statutes which have
5. See cases cited note 44 infra; Forkosch, Internal Affairs of Unions: Govern-
inent Control or Self-Regudation-?, 18 U. CHI. L. Rev. 729, 735 (1950). "Courts have
generally permitted union interpretation and enforcement of their own constitutional
provisions, even though the result may be to limit a member's freedom of action or
his union constitutional rights." Ibid.
6. Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have such statutes. See Hearings Before the SuibcoMnnittee
on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1429-42 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings), where
these statutes are collected.
7. For a collection of statutes dealing with particular problems involved in union
initiation fees, dues, assessments, registration of representatives, financial reports, and
election of union officers see Aaron & Kamaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal
Union Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425 (1949). For further analysis of these statutes
see Dodd, Sone State Legislatures Go to War on Labor Unions, 29 IowA L. REv. 148
(1944) ; Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legislation, 15 U. CHi. L. Rev. 282 (1948);
Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 546.
8. 188 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
9. 188 S.W.2d at 282. The court also held the provisions to be unnecessary to
the operation and enforcement of the valid provisions of the act requiring unions to
keep accurate books and to itemize receipts.
10. AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 100, 155 P.2d 145, 150 (1944). An Idaho
statute which sought to regulate a variety of union activities including picketing and
boycotting fell afoul of a state constitutional provision demanding that each act must
embrace but one subject which must be expressed in the title. AFL v. Langley, 66
Idaho 763, 168 P.2d 831 (1946).
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survived the constitutional attacks often are grossly inadequate, usually
because of limited coverage. Thus, it has been said that "these states
which have attempted to regulate the internal administration of labor unions
have almost without exception enacted laws which offer insufficient pro-
tection to individual employees and unduly restrict union activities." "1
The absence of reported decisions involving statutes of a more formidable
nature would seem to indicate that these enactments are not vigorously
enforced. Finally, local regulation suffers from the limited jurisdiction
allowed to states by our federal system of government. In Hill v. Florida"2
the United States Supreme Court held that a Florida statute which re-
quired the licensing of union business agents was invalid under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution because of a conflict with the National
Labor Relations Act.'3 Although the federal legislation did not cover the
specific area with which the Florida statute was concerned, the Court
decided that the statute prevented the union and its selected representatives
from functioning as collective bargaining agents except upon conditions
fixed by the state, and thus the local law interfered with the full freedom
of employees under the Wagner Act to select bargaining representatives
of their own choosing.14
Prior federal treatment of these problems has been similarly de-
ficient. The Taft-Hartley Act does require filing of union financial state-
ments and reports of business practices and procedures, but the informa-
tion thus compiled was never made public, nor was it ever used for any
purpose.1,5 The act also imposes criminal sanctions on employers who
pay, and union officials who receive, money or other things of value; how-
ever, the provision does not appear to be aggressively enforced, perhaps
because of the difficulty of detection.'6
II. UNION FILING
Concerned primarily with more spectacular areas, the Select Com-
mittee only incidentally inquired into matters of internal union organiza-
tion such as regular auditing, accounting procedures and authorization for
disbursements. Consequently in this area the extent to which undesirable
practices exist is an unknown quantity. The Kennedy-Ives Bill, however,
11. Aaron & Kamaroff, supra note 7, at 464, discussing statutes of Colorado,
Florida, Massachusetts, Texas and Wisconsin.
12. 325 U.S. 538 (1945). See Katz, Two Decades of State Labor Legislation.
1937-1957, 8 LAB. L.J. 747 (1957), for a discussion of this case.
13. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act).
14. One explanation for state reluctance to more aggressively enact labor legis-
lation has been suggested by Professor Cox of Harvard: "The [federal] Govern-
ment has this duty [of regulating unions] because labor unions enjoy their present
power by virtue of federal statutes .... " Subcommittee Hearings 344. (Emphasis
added.)
15. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159
(1952); see note 89 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
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undertook to require that there be filed with the Secretary of Labor de-
tailed statements concerning
"procedures followed with respect to qualifications for or restrictions
on memberships . . . calling of regular and special meetings, levy-
ing assessments, impositions of fines . . . authorizations for dis-
bursements of union funds, audit of union financial transactions . . .
expulsion of members and grounds thereof . . . 17
and an annual financial statement adequate to disclose the financial con-
dition and operation during the preceding fiscal year.18  Required in detail
were salaries, loans to business enterprises and the security thereof, and
other disbursements of any kind and the purposes thereof. 19 The bill
required that copies of these reports be furnished by the union to members
free of charge and to others at cost,20 presumably by the Commissioner
of Labor Reports, an office provided for in the bill.2 ' The filing require-
ments were adopted in preference to a suggested code 2 which would have,
inter alia, provided a limit on initiation fees, required a stated number
of meetings, and forbidden expense allowances unless approved by the
union electorate. The imposition of a detailed code would require a
revision by many unions of their constitutions without an adequate show-
ing of necessity. Such a code would also ignore the fact that widely varied
rules and procedures can be equally necessary and satisfactory depending
upon the particular circumstances of the union. The approach of the
Kennedy-Ives Bill is based on the supposition that the most desirable
immediate approach would be to require filing by the unions of periodic
reports as to their practices and procedures. The information which would
17. S. 3974, supra note 3, § 101.
18. These sections are taken verbatim from the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952) (hereinafter
cited by U.S.C. section only). However, the Secretary of Labor had no power to
question the validity of these reports and their accuracy was not checked. Subcom-
mittee Hearings 43.
19. Specific abuses in the handling of union funds were alleged by witnesses at
the hearings. For example, the Senate Committee reported that Frank Brewster
(chairman of the Western Conference of Teamsters) persuaded the "secretary-
treasurer of local 690 . ..to make loans of union dues money . ..for the operation
of a gambling establishment; to . . .a notorious . . .gambler and underworld figure,
for the payment of his income taxes; and to . .. a close personal friend of Dave
Beck, for the purchase of a bar in Seattle." Interim Report 39. In addition to
improper loans, there was evidence of questionable expenditures. For example, James
Ioffa allegedly expended "some $174,870 for the legal defense of union officials
accused of extortion, dynamiting, and accepting bribes..." and made further
payments to some of these officials while they were serving penitentiary offenses.
Id. at 252. "Brewster poured some $440,000 into a dying Canadian truck line ...
[T]he clear fact is that the teamsters put up this large sum of money at great risk that
they would never get it back. . . ." Id. at 60. See also id. at 441.
20. S. 3974, supra note 3, § 104.
21. This was a floor amendment to the bill. The Commissioner was to perform
duties delegated by the Secretary of Labor. 104 CONG. REc. 10074 (daily ed. June 14,
1958).
22. S. 3618, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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thus be compiled would enable Congress at a later date to decide, on an
informed basis, whether a need exists for imposition of a code of union
business practices and what particular requirements would most efficiently
cure the diversity of problems that may be revealed.3 Furthermore, by
making these reports available to union members, doubtful practices would
be brought to the attention of the individuals most directly affected and
encourage them to vote miscreants from office.2 4 While publicity was a pur-
pose sought by the bill, it would seem that detailed filing could create
tremendous administrative obstacles to the attainment of this end.25 Fur-
ther, the filing of an excessive number of documents would render difficult
any attempt to compile statistics on the types and prevalence of undesir-
able practices. The filing required under the Kennedy-Ives Bill, while
free of the unnecessary detail present in some alternative proposals, would
still result in the filing of voluminous documents.
As offered to the Senate the bill also provided that loans of union
money to union officers and employees would have to be reported. Dur-
ing the Senate debates this was amended to forbid such loans in excess
of $1,500 yearly.26 Why loans should be treated differently from other
practices is unclear. If filing is deemed adequate to deter or remedy other
practices, then it should be at least equally effective when union funds
are disbursed.
Experience under the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that sufficient crim-
inal sanctions for noncompliance with the filing requirements would need
to be provided to insure union cooperation. While that law requires
unions to file annual reports of most of the practices covered by the
Kennedy-Ives Bill,27 no such criminal penalty for failure to do so is pre-
scribed and a number of unions have disregarded the demand.2 8  Although
23. Evidence that this may have been the senatorial intent may be derived from
such provisions as § 403 requiring the Secretary of Labor to report on the act stating
the conclusions drawn from the filing after a three year period, and § 401 of the bill
which expressly states the desirability of unions and management adopting ethical
codes conforming to the guarantees in the bill. However, provisions such as § 106
exempting small unions from filing suggests a permanent nature since in an interim
period it would be desirable to collect detailed information on the procedures of all
unions.
24. "It is the intent of this proposal to bring union-employer financial trans-
actions into the open light of day, where conflict of interest, bribes, and collusion
cannot long exist." Subcmminttee Hearings 27. The same reasoning is applicable to
the filing of union practices and procedures. See discussion in text accompanying
note 86 infra as to union apathy.
25. An example of a bill which would have greatly burdened the Comnnissioner
of Labor reports was a proposal, in the administration's bill, that there be filed
"copies of the constitution and by-laws of the labor organization and of every amend-
ment to them, and of every separate rule, resolution, minute, or other official document
which governs membership . . . ." Subcommittee Hearings 1466.
26. See 104 CONG. REc. 10073 (daily ed. June 14, 1958).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952). The filing requirements of this act were upheld as
constitutional in National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C),
aff'd, 334 U.S. 854 (1948), thus laying to rest the doubt as to such provisions expressed
in AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1944).
28. Subcomnittee Hearings 49.
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this sanction is justified, other means of punishing noncompliance which
were proposed do not appear to be as well advised. The administration
bill provided that unions violating the statute should forfeit their tax-
exempt status. 29  Other proposals suggested the withdrawal of antitrust
and injunction immunities, 0 and loss of access to the National Labor
Relations Board.31  The failing of these suggestions lies in the fact that
their effect would be upon the union membership, whom the act is seeking
to protect, and not upon the wrongdoers.
A hopeful sign of acceptance by the unions of their own responsibility
in this matter is indicated by the recently adopted AFL-CIO Code of
Ethical Practices 32 which establishes minimum practices and procedures
to be followed by its affiliated units. Should the labor groups effectively
police their own ranks, interference by the government would be unneces-
sary.P The filing requirements would aid in the program of self-regulation
by disclosing abuses to the membership, and at the same time provide an
impetus for union action by impressing them with the fact that the trend
of future legislation will depend in great part on their efforts.
III. EMBEZZLEMENT
As passed by the Senate, the Kennedy-Ives Bill provided that em-
bezzlement, stealing, or unlawful conversion of union funds by a union
employee would be punishable by a $10,000 fine or five years imprison-
29. See President's 1958 Labor Message, Subcommittee Hearings 3.
30. See remarks of Senator Knowland explaining these proposals. Sirbcomt-
mittee Hearings 184.
31. Access to the NLRB for certification as collective bargaining agent was
denied to unions whose officers failed to file non-communist affidavits under Taft-
Hartley, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1952). For a discussion of the advantages inhering in
certification see General Box Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949). However, the real effect
of this sanction has been questioned. See WOLLET, LABOR RELATIONS AND FEDERAL
LAW 34 (1949).
32. The Code was approved in sections by the AFL-CIO Executive Council and
affirmed by the vote of the Second Constitutional Convention at Atlantic City in
December 1957. "The six ethical practice codes deal with paper local (locals without
members) ; health and welfare funds; racketeers, crooks, Communists, and Fascists;
investments and business interests of union officials; financial practices and proprietary
activities of unions; minimum accounting and financial controls; and union democratic
practices." Letter From George Meany to Presidents of Affiliated National and
International Unions, Feb. 7, 1958. All unions were required to adopt the Code by
April 15, 1958. For a copy of the Code see Subcommittee Hearings 91-109.
"Responsible trade unionists concerned with the abuse of power on the part of
a few individuals have promulgated excellent codes of self-regulation which would
to a large extent clean up the problems which have arisen. These AFL-CIO codes
of ethical practices, following the recent action of the executive council, are now
applicable to all unions affiliated with the AFL-CIO." Remarks of Senator Kennedy,
Subcommittee Hearings 2.
33. See Aaron & Kamaroff, supra note 7, at 649. The desirability of any bill"must be tempered by the recognition of . . . two basic criteria . . . : first, the
importance of holding governmental interference to a minimum, and second, the
desirability of inducing unions to assume the chief responsibility for maintaining
democratic organizations."
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ment.3 4 While the hearings uncovered many practices which, if proven in
a court of law, would be covered by this provision,3 5 it is significant to
note that a statute proscribing the embezzlement of private funds is a
radical departure from prior federal legislation. Heretofore all such
statutes were concerned with misappropriation of federal funds or em-
bezzlement by federal officers of funds entrusted to the Government.3
The direct injury to the federal government resulting from such conduct
amply justifies federal criminal jurisdiction over its funds. The misap-
propriation of private property, however, only indirectly affects the inter-
ests of the federal government, and, as the conduct is criminal by state
law,37 the creation of federal jurisdiction will frequently result in the
imposition of a double penalty for a single criminal act. Lack of local
enforcement indicates that this harsh procedure may be justified here3 8
For example, it is noted that all the alleged misappropriations disclosed
at the hearings were uncovered by committee investigators, and, although
some were of spectacular character, not one resulted from independent in-
vestigations by state authorities. Perhaps this is illustrative of the atti-
tude, expressed by some,39 that labor problems are federal problems.
Furthermore, the lack of deterrent effect of the state embezzlement laws
is indicated by the fact that some union officials do not even appear to
realize the gravity of misuse of union funds. 40 Perhaps it was this reason
that prompted some influential union leaders to support this provision.4 '
34. S. 3974, supra note 3, § 108.
35. The Committee reported that Frank Brewster used union funds to finance his
racing stables and other personal items. "This personal appropriation of funds even
extended to the $4,000 downpayment on Brewster's Palm Springs home, which was
paid with a check drawn on the local 174 'special fund."' Interim Report 59-60.
"Dave Beck took, not borrowed, more than $370,000 in union funds. . . . When
confronted by an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Beck began
restitution which even at the time of the committee hearings, some 3 years later, had
not been completed." Id. at 85. See also id. at 129, 159, 439.
36. See BurDicK, LAw oF Cprmm 568 (1946) for a collection and discussion of
these statutes.
37. Id. at 575-75h.
38. The findings of the Select Committee stated that "some law-enforcement
officers have shied away from active investigation of labor-management violence
because of fear of offending either side in the dispute." Interim Report 6. The
refusal to interfere in union matters may extend to embezzlement as well.
39. See note 13 supra.
40. The fact that some union officials fail to realize the seriousness and responsi-
bility of their union position is borne out by this testimony in reference to the em-
bezzlement provision: "Let's take a poor fellow working as a janitor in a railroad
office down in Mississippi. He is the secretary of the local union. Now, he goes
home at night and the kids need some medicine. He has collected the month's dues
that day from some members. He goes down to the drug store and pays for the
medicine. He intends to pay it back payday. Payday comes along and he does not
put it back. Our auditor comes in and finds him technically short in his accounts.
Are you going to send him to the penitentiary for 5 years and fine him $10,000?
How are you going to get anybody to act as secretaries? They do not want the job
anyway." Subcommittee Hearings 1213.
41. George Meany, speaking for the AFL-CIO, suggested that embezzlement of
union assets be made a federal crime. Subcommittee Hearings 1347.
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At any rate, if effective investigation need be undertaken by federal authori-
ties, it would seem desirable to provide for enforcement in the federal courts.
IV. ELECTIONS
While the McClellan Committee revealed a number of instances of
undemocratic union election practices,4 it might be thought that the limited
scope of the Committee investigation would not justify the imposition of
government regulation on private union elections. The provisions dealing
with election safeguards, however, may be characterized as the very heart
of the legislative measure. Although some particular practices and pro-
cedures were to be specifically regulated by the provisions of the bill, its
main thrust was directed toward public disclosure of union practices in
the hope that the membership itself would undertake aggressive house-
cleaning. The information thus made available would hardly be efficacious
if the membership were unable to effectively cast their ballots without fear
of coercion and without manipulation of the tallying. Furthermore, judicial
construction of federal legislation, depriving individual workers in a recog-
nized bargaining union from negotiating with management as to conditions
of employment,4 indicates a need to protect the right of individuals to
exert effective control over their bargaining representatives. Judicial safe-
guards have not been completely adequate since some courts have been
reluctant to interfere when there has been even a semblance of compliance
with union procedure."4
The Kennedy-Ives Bill would have required periodic elections, use of
a secret ballot, notice of elections, and opportunity to nominate.4 It would
have guaranteed the right to vote to every member, and forbidden the use
of union money to promote the cause of any candidate. 4 It has been
suggested that the obvious defect of the bill lies in its failure to impose
criminal sanctions on violators,47 which would seem to be the most
efficacious means of dealing with individuals who would deny to others
their electorate rights.
The secret ballot provision has been objected to as an imposition on a
large number of unions not presently requiring such a procedure, 48 with-
42. For example, in Scranton Local 229 (Teamsters) it was found that rigged
elections and multiple voting were prevalent Interim Report 105. In New York
all garbage dealers were made to join the union, but since they were employers they
were denied the right to vote. Id. at 329.
43. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); NLRB v. J. H. Allison Co.,
165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948). See WERNxE, LABOR
RELATONS 277-78 (1951).
44. Gray v. Reuther, 201 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1952) ; Stanton v. Harris, 152 Fla.
736, 13 So. 2d 17 (1943) ; State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 233 Ind. 235, 117
N.E2d 553 (1954).
45. S. 3974, supra note 3, § 301.
46. Ibid.
47. "If it is a proper function of Government to require regular union elections
by secret ballot, the Government should lay down the Rules and punish violators
." Testimony of Professor Archibald Cox, Subcommittee Hearings 357.
48. "[O]nly 17Y2 percent of the 194 international unions with a total membership
of 17% million have constitutions which specifically provide for the use of a secret
ballot." Subcommittee Hearings 200.
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out an adequate showing of necessity. The justification for it emerges
from the inherent weaknesses in other methods of voting, not present in
the secret ballot.49 However, even the secret ballot has apparently been
abused by some unions, e.g., by- stuffing ballot boxes,50 permitting multiple
voting by some members.51 To be effective, legislation should not only
prescribe the form of voting, but also provide criminal sanctions for
fraudulent operation of it.
The remedy provided by the bill was invalidation of improperly con-
ducted elections.62 The bill would have allowed any union member who
had exhausted his internal remedies, or who had invoked the available
remedies without obtaining a final decision within four months after their
invocation, to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within one
month thereafter alleging the violation of any election provision. The
Secretary was then to investigate the complaint, and, if he found probable
cause to believe that a violation had occurred, he was to bring a civil action
against the union in the federal district court to set aside the invalid election.
If upon a preponderance of the evidence the court found that conduct in
violation of the bill's provisions had been established, the court was to
declare the election void and direct the Secretary of Labor to hold one under
his supervision. If the complaint alleged that there had been a failure to
hold an election, the Secretary, after investigating, was to petition the court
to allow him to conduct an election under his supervision. While this
would seem to be a salutary measure, it is noteworthy that under many
constitutions the union can fine, expel from the union, or otherwise dis-
cipline a member who engages in conduct deemed by the officers to be
anti-union.63 To be effective, it would seem that the Kennedy-Ives Bill
should have prohibited unions from disciplining members who petition the
Secretary in good faith. The possibility that a court might later afford
protection to the member by ordering reinstatement or removal of the fine
is at best an expensive and uncertain remedy.5 4 Requiring a union mem-
ber to protect his rights in a law suit, without a legislative guaranty, could
result in many individuals refraining from petitioning the Secretary.
Another Senate proposal 5 would have required the Secretary to
supervise an election whenever a petition of ten per cent of the union mem-
49. The president of the Bakers Union was able to perpetuate himself in office
by discarding the constitutional requirement for a secret ballot and making delegates
vote by a show of hands method. Interim Report 128-31. Hand and voice votes
can be, and have been, arbitrarily judged. Id. at 271.
50. "Swanson [manager of San Francisco Local 3 of the International Union of
Operating Engineers-IUOE], without any feeling of guilt, admitted the rigging of
an international election by the stuffing of ballot boxes . . . in a mountain cabin
hideaway. . . . His justification [was] that he was only doing what everybody else
in the international was doing...." Id. at 439.
51. See note 45 supra.
52. S. 3974, supra note 3, § 302.
53. Subcommittee Hearings 244.
54. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Hav. L. REv. 1049,
1068-69 (1951), and cases cited therein.
55. S. 3618, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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bers requested it. This provision recognized the desirability of having elec-
tions supervised instead of later trying to investigate alleged illegal practices.
However, if supervision were constantly sought, the expense and burden on
government facilities could be tremendous.
One method of having supervision without overburdening government
would lie in the voluntary establishment by unions of impartial tribunals
composed of citizens of respectable stature, unassociated with the appointing
union or any other, to exercise supervisory authority over union elections.
The original Kennedy Bill included a provision for having such groups
supervise trusteeships,5 6 and during the Senate debates a proposal which
would have established supervisory election boards representing all factions
in the union was rejected by a single vote.5 7 Such a provision would be
desirable not only because it would alleviate the burden on government but
self-regulation would also be a more acceptable procedure to the unions
themselves. Establishment of such tribunals would create little procedural
difficulty within the framework of the bill. Unions could simply request
exemption from government supervision of their elections upon presenta-
tion to the Secretary of Labor of a list of the proposed members of the
tribunal, a statement as to their union affiliations, and a description of the
powers with which they are to be vested to effectuate election supervision.
Exemption should not be granted unless the tribunal's powers are com-
mensurate with those which might have been exercised by the Secretary.
A right of appeal to the Secretary by union members should be preserved
only for charges of fraud or gross misconduct on the part of the private
supervisory tribunal.
It is interesting to note that the Upholsterers and the United Auto
Workers have recently instituted such a procedure,0 8 and as to these it has
been said: "These boards have broad jurisdiction, including the power
to review internal disciplinaryproceedings. There is every reason to expect
56. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
57. The proposal introduced on the Senate floor was defeated by a vote of 45-44.
104 CoNG. REc. 10361 (daily ed. June 17, 1958). In its labor union "Bill of Rights"
the American Civil Liberties Union provided that on petition of 10% of the membership
an election must be supervised by an impartial outside agency. Subcommittee Hear-
ings 1118.
58. A Review Board was established by the Upholsterers in 1954. Appointees
to the Board at that time were Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School, Chairman;
Nathan Feinsinger, University of Wisconsin Law School; Paul Herzog, then Assist-
ant Dean of the Harvard School of Public Administration; Father Leo C. Brown,
S.J., of St. Louis University; J. Benton Gillingham, Assistant Director of the Uni-
versity of Washington Institute of Labor Economics; Father Dennis J. Comey, S.J.,
of the Institute of Industrial Relations at St. Joseph's College; Clark Kerr, Chancellor
of the University of California; Curtis J. Bok, President Judge of Court of Common
Pleas No. 6, Philadelphia; and Joseph D. Lahman, Former Chairman of the Illinois
State Parole Commission.
The United Auto Workers' Appeal Board was created in April 1957. The
appointees to the Board were Rabbi Morris Adler of Detroit; Monsignor George
Higgins of Washington, D.C.; Clark Kerr; Edwin Witte, University of Wisconsin;
Wade McCree, Judge of the Detroit Circuit Court; and Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of
Washington, D.C.
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that both of these private boards will offer the union member protection
comparable to any that might be provided by legislation." 19
V. TRuSTE-SHIPS
The trusteeship is a device provided for in most union constitutions
whereby the international assumes the management of a local when it feels
that the local is not being properly operated. This right of visitation and
taking over of union finances is omnipotent if the constitution provides for
it and is usually judicially impregnable.6 The findings of the Senate Com-
mittee suggest that the device has been employed at times to foster cor-
ruption, to keep in office those friendly to the international,61 and to exert
a continuing dominion over the local.6 Since the trusteeship is a valuable
device for regulating a local union which is not performing the duties owed
to the membership or which is in an unsound financial condition, it should
be regulated rather than forbidden. To this end the Kennedy-Ives Bill
required that when a trusteeship was created the international should file
a report of the purposes of the trusteeship and make semi-annual reports
thereafter until the trusteeship is ended.6 Experience has shown that mere
disclosure of purpose is insufficient to prevent either long reigns of trustee-
ships or misappropriation of funds.64 To prevent the latter the bill provided
that during the period of the trusteeship the removal of funds to the inter-
59. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1349 (1958).
60. FoRxoscH, LABOR LAw 333 (1953), and cases cited therein.
61. 'When the membership revolted against four officials of a local in Pontiac,
Mich., after they had been accused of extortion, the international put the local under
trusteeship, making Jimmy Hoffa the trustee. He then turned around and appointed
two of the same men as business agents to run the affairs of the local,' Interim
Report 448.
62. "Trusteeships have been imposed-for no apparent reason-as a means of
continuing domination over the affairs of a number of locals of the [IUOE].
Two locals in Chicago . . . have been under trusteeship for 29 years." Id. at 438.
"Trusteeships . . . have been imposed on 12 IUOE locals representing about one-fifth
of the total membership .... Of the IUOE locals now so saddled, 7 have been
under trusteeship for at least 10 years ... " Id. at 371. "Some 13 percent of all
the locals in the teamsters union are under trusteeship, teamster officials have admitted
• . . that they do not know the reason why some were put under trusteeship or
why they remain in that state at the present time. Some of the locals have been
under trusteeship for 15 years." Id. at 448. The findings of the committee report
that "a Chicago local of the Bakery Workers Union placed under trusteeship was
looted of $40,000. Some $13,000, appropriated for a 'joint organizational drive' was
used for the purchase of two Cadillacs for International President James Cross and
International Vice-President George Stuart. Another $10,500 was spent by Stuart
in an 'organizational drive' which was . . . non existent .... " Subcommittee
Hearings 247.
63. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1958). Section 202 provides that "trustee-
ships shall be established and administered by a national or international labor organi-
zation over a subordinate body only in accordance with the constitution of such
organization and for the purpose of correcting corruption or financial malpractice,
assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements, . . . restoring demo-
cratic procedures or otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such labor
organization."
64, See Subcommittee Hearings 352.
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national was forbidden.0 5 The bill, however, failed to demand an account-
ing of the local's funds at the institution and termination of the trusteeship
which would seem to be necessary to prevent a clandestine removal of
funds. To insure against extended impositions it was provided that trustee-
ships were presumed valid for eighteen months and invalid thereafter. The
use of a presumption creates a desirable flexibility since a trusteeship can
be ended in a shorter time if feasible to do so, while allowing it to exist
longer than eighteen months if circumstances demand it. The bill also
provided0 6 that a court might end the trusteeship at any time on proof that
it was "not established in good faith for a purpose allowable under [the
act] ." 07
The establishment of impartial boards to supervise the duration
and functioning of trusteeships can be employed as an alternative to a
judicial appeal provided the outside group has the power to end invalid
trusteeships. Besides the advantages inherent in self-regulation, such a
procedure would avoid additional burdens on already overcrowded court
calendars and have the advantage of prompt action which courts can
rarely offer. Such an approach was embodied in the original Kennedy
Bill.08 The legislative history is silent as to why this procedure was not
adopted, but it was omitted in the Kennedy-Ives Bill presented to the Senate.
It is significant that the AFL-CIO took the position that if trusteeships
were to be regulated, the only acceptable approach would be a bill allow-
ing for alternative regulation by impartial outside groups.0 9
65. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 203.
66. Id. § 204.
67. See note 63 supra.
68. "The Kennedy bill also provides an elaborate alternative to Federal regu-
lation and Labor Board enforcement, as follows: an international union may apply
to the Secretary of Labor for a certificate exempting it from Labor Board enforce-
ment of these provisions, sections 204-206. In order to secure such an exemption,
an international union must establish an independent and impartial appeal board,
with jurisdiction to make final decisions upon the institution and continuance of
trusteeships, section 204a.
"The appeal board must be composed exclusively of members drawn from a
panel established by the Secretary of Labor. Appeal board members must be ap-
pointed for a minimum of 2 years, and no one may be a member who 'has served or
intends to serve as an arbitrator in any proceeding,' involving the international union
or any local, section 204b.
"The Secretary of Labor may not grant a certificate unless he finds that 'mini-
mum protection' afforded local unions by the provisions of the international union
constitution and bylaws under which the appeal board will operate 'will be substan-
tially as great' as the protection available through the National Labor Relations
Board, section 204. An exemption certificate is valid for 2 years, and the Secretary
of Labor's decision to grant or deny it is final, section 204." Subcommittee Hearings
69-70. It should also be noted that as presented to the Senate the Kennedy-Ives Bill
provided for appeals to the Secretary of Labor who, upon a showing of probable
cause of violation, would institute action in the courts to end the trusteeship. As
the above statement illustrates the original Kennedy Bill provided for Labor Board
enforcement. The omission of this Board enforcement apparently resulted from the
evidence presented at the hearing of the heavy workload of the Board. See Sub-
committee Hearings 803-20.
69. Id. at 70 (statement of George Meany).
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VI. CONVICTS
The presence of persons with criminal records serving as officers in
some unions provided one of the spectacular highlights of the hearings.70
It is not without significance that the unions charged with the most abusive
practices were the unions where employment of such persons flourished.
The congressional desire to regulate this practice in order to protect the
membership , evoked the provision that
"No person who, by reason of conviction of any felony,72 is ineligible
to vote in any election held under the laws of the state of his legal
residence shall serve as an officer, director, or trustee, member of any
executive committee or similar governing body, business agent, man-
ager, or paid organizer of a labor organization engaged in an industry
affecting commerce." 73
The inadequacy of the awkvard qualification, that no one can hold a union
position if his prior crimes prevent him from voting in the state of his
residence, readily appears from an examination of state statutes. All
states impose some voting disqualifications but the laws vary greatly, par-
ticularly with respect to the crimes on which they are conditioned. For
example, in some states only those convicted of violating election laws are
denied the right to vote; 74 others refer to treason and bribery and crimes
deemed infamous at common law.7 5 Under a statute of the latter type an
70. "If an occasional law violator had found his way into the teamster organi-
zation, this might be a noble sentiment. But on the basis of these hearings, it
appears to the committee that a criminal background was a prerequisite for job
placement and advancement within the teamster firmament." Interim Report 449.
71. "Between them [John Dioguardi and Anthony Corallol they brought 40 men
into the labor movement in positions of trust and responsibility-men who, among
them, had been arrested a remarkable total of 178 times and convicted on 77 of these
occasions for crimes ranging from theft, violation of the Harrison Narcotics Act,
extortion, conspiracy, bookmaking, use of stink bombs, felonious assault, robbery,
. . . violation of the gun laws, being an accessory to murder . . . . [A]fter
going to work for Dioguardi and Corallo in the New York labor movement, 25 of
these men were convicted or indicted for extortion, perjury, bribery, and forgery."
rnterim Report 218. Other instances of widespread but less spectacular criminal
infiltration were uncovered during the course of the hearings. See, e.g., Interim
Report 367, 440.
72. In AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), a Texas
statute prohibiting a convicted felon from holding union office was upheld as con-
stitutional.
73. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 305. This provision was a floor amendment offered
by Senator McNamara. 104 Cong. Rec. 9886 (daily ed. June 12, 1958).
74. MASs. ANN. LAWs ch. 55, §37 (1958) (persons found guilty of corrupt
election practices shall be disenfranchised for three years from date of conviction);
N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANiq J 69:13 (1955) (persons convicted of treason, bribery, or any
willful violation of the federal or New Hampshire election laws shall be disen-
franchised unless restored to the privilege of an elector by the Supreme Court on
notice to the Attorney General).
75. R.I. CONST. amend. 24, § 1 (no person convicted of bribery or of any crime
deemed infamous at common law is permitted to vote until he is expressly restored
to the right to vote by act of the General Assembly). Ky. CONST. §§ 145, 150 (per-
sons convicted of a felony shall be excluded from the right of suffrage, but persons
excluded may be restored to their civil rights by executive pardon).
1959]
698 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
embezzler 76 would not be denied the right to vote and thus could hold
union office even though such a person might be the very type who is to be
most feared in a position of trust. The variations among the states also
extend to the procedure by which voting rights are reacquired,7 7 a further
reason for casting doubt on the wisdom of the bill as passed. The original
Kennedy-Ives Bill would have forbidden convicts from being employed
by unions for a period of five years after their conviction.78 It is interesting
to note that in this area the AFL-CIO Code goes further than either bill.
Under the Code not only convicts are excluded from union employment but
also those "showing an interest in corrupt purposes," 79 whether actually
convicted or not.80
On analysis it seems that both of the Senate bills are inadequate. The
bill as passed hardly affords an efficient standard for judging the worth
of individuals. Furthermore, the bill is inherently incapable of affording
to all convicts uniformity of treatment-a suggested justification for federal
legislation. The five year proviso of the initial Kennedy-Ives Bill would
have allowed convicts to resume union positions regardless of their un-
desirability.
The bill, as approved by the Senate, was helpful in that it delineated
the offices which are to be withheld from such persons. The bill forbade
convicts from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of any execu-
tive committee or similar governing body, business agent, manager or paid
organizer. A broad denial of employment to any union job, e.g., clerical
work, would serve no useful purpose.
The prime criticism to which the Senate proposals are subject lies
not in their drafting, but rather in the proposals themselves. A federal
statute limiting employment accessibility to convicted persons appears to
be both undesirable and unnecessary. Such a statute would embody the
congressional attitude that convicted persons are per se unworthy. Though
the bill would be limited to union employment its indirect effect could
be far greater. Prospective employers in any trade might well adopt
this attitude, thus further constricting the employment opportunities for
persons with criminal records. At the very least such a statute could
seriously hinder conscientious and worthwhile rehabilitation programs.
This is not to suggest that the problem need be ignored. Rather it ap-
pears that the means for adequate treatment already inhere in the bill.
The hoped-for result of the filing requirements and election safeguards
is that, through a proper functioning of the two, conscientious and able
76. Embezzlement was not a common-law crime. Buanicx, Cpm Es 564 (1946).
77. See notes 74, 75 supra.
78. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 305, as offered to Senate for approval.
79. AFL-CIO CODE OF ETmCAL PRACTICEs III-Racketeers, Crooks, Communists,
and Fascists (1957).
80. As passed by the Senate the bill imposed no criminal sanction on union vio-
lence. The attempt to regulate the employment of convicts, who were often hired
for this purpose, may explain this omission.
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officials will attain the leadership of unions. If this result follows then
provisions dealing directly with convicted persons seem superfluous, since
persons likely to violate the rights of the membership will not be elected
to positions of leadership or put in positions of trust by those so elected.
If these convicted persons have not been engaged in these activities then
there would be no need to end their employment. Allowing individual
unions to deal with the problem provides for a measure of fairness and
obviates any need which might exist for legislation.
VII. CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS
The Kennedy-Ives Bill 8 1 required union officials to file with the
Secretary of Labor personal statements listing all loans and salaries and
income received from employers whose employees are represented by such
union, together with records of all stock held in such company and busi-
ness transactions with such employer.8 2  If the payment or business trans-
action was made to or involved the wife or minor child of the union
official, instead of the official himself, this would also be reported.P The
choice not to impose criminal sanctions " on this type of conflict of
interest resulted from the fact that such situations were not always harmful,
but their tendency to become so, due to the less than arm's-length atmos-
phere which might arise between employer and union bargaining agent,
necessitated some form of control. Filing would serve the purpose of
bringing the existence of such situations into the open, and exposing them
to the membership.8 With this information the membership could vote
those people from office. It is recognized that many persons doubt the
realism of relying on voluntary union action as a forceful sanction. It
is not infrequently asserted that voluntary union action is either inade-
quate 6 or nonexistent. While union apathy unquestionably exists, the
81. S. 3974, suPra note 63, § 102.
82. It was reported that the "business manager of Local 825 of the International
Union of Operating Engineers, secured a one-eighth interest in Public Constructors,
Inc., in exchange for a loan of $2,500. Public Constructors, Inc., did business in the
territorial jurisdiction of Local 825 and had collective bargaining agreements with
that union. On September 30, 1957, the book value of the shares was $108,677."
Subcommittee Hearings 348. James Cross, president of Bankers Union negotiated
a sweetheart contract with Zion Industries. Prior to this the President of this com-
pany reportedly loaned $100,000 to Cross. Interim Report 122-24. See also id. at 250,
372, 442.
83. "Mrs. Dave Beck purchased 40 percent of the stock of K & L Distributing
Co. which distributed beer for Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a majority of whose employees
are members of the . . . Teamsters. The territory of K & L was enlarged and it
received preferential shipments of beer as a result of Dave Beck's influence. Later
the investment was sold at a 607 profit." Subcommittee Hearings 348.
84. Failure to file or false filing warranted a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of
one year. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 107.
85. An apparent oversight of the lawmakers was to fail to provide for copies of
this particular filing to be sent to the membership whereas all other filing would
have been sent to them.
86. See President's 1958 Labor Message, Subcommittee Hearings 3.
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prime reason for it may well be attributable to the fact that heretofore
union members, if they wished to act, had to uncover the facts for them-
selves often at substantial personal risk 8 7 and without adequate means for
doing it. The great value in requiring that copies of statements filed by
the officers be given to members is that it would enable members to face
elections with knowledge of admitted instances of violations of union trust.
With this knowledge and fortified by the other safeguards of the act, such
as free elections and recall,88 it is likely that the membership will elect
more desirable officers. The argument that members will not act when
informed is not based on experience, since never before have union mem-
bers been informed as they would be under such a law, nor have the mem-
bers had the procedure to effectuate reform without subjecting themselves
to personal intimidation. Although Taft-Hartley requires the filing of cer-
tain information as to internal practices, these reports have not been made
available to union members.89
87. The presence of violence is not the only risk. Many unions discipline their
members for any act unbecoming a union member or contrary to the interests of the
union. Often this takes the form of limiting the right of members to criticize their
union officers. A few unions prohibit the organization of groups within the union
if they are intended to shape union policy or influence the selection of union officers.
Subcommittee Hearings 224. Recently courts have been more willing to intervene
in internal affairs, and in cases involving union discipline the courts now seem to
favor the individual if the issue is criticism of the organization or its leadership.
See Sanders v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 130 F. Supp. 253 (W.D.
Ky. 1955) (life expulsion from union too severe a penalty); Pierson, The Govern-
inent of Trade Unions, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. REv 593, 601 (1948). But when legal
action against unions or its officers is sought the courts demand that internal remedies
be exhausted unless it would be futile. Johnson, Governwnt Regulation of Internal
Union Affairs, 5 LAB L.J. 807, 809 (1954). But see Summers, Legal Limitations
on Union Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1092 (1951), suggesting that the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies in this context exists in name only. See Mooney v. Bar-
tenders Union, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P2d 857 (1957) (mandamus proceedings to com-
pel union to let members see books and inspect records permitted without exhaustion
of internal remedies).
88. While the original Kennedy-Ives Bill contained no recall provision, various
proposals were offered on the Senate floor. The bill finally adopted allowed recall
on vote of a majority of the membership. The falling of the bill was that it would
have also required a majority of the members in order to petition for a recall vote.
104 CONG. Rxc. 10106 (daily ed. June 14, 1958). A more efficacious and practical
measure would have been to allow a recall vote if 20% of the members petition for it,
but requiring a majority vote of the membership for passage. See id. at 10107. The
arguments against recall, e.g., harassment, could all be satisfied by proper drafting;
thus, recall should only be allowed when the officer is involved in a situation likely
to be detrimental to the interests of the members. The value of recall lies in pro-
viding a procedure for ending the term of office of such people quickly, and possibly
before the conflict has resulted in any actual harm. This is not a revolutionary
measure; many unions already provide for recall. Subcommittee Hearings 183. The
Senate proposal would require that the election be held under the auspices of the
Secretary of Labor, thus preventing the intimidation present when such elections
are held by the union. The Secretary could also judge whether the recall election
was for an allowable purpose. If, however, the union had an impartial tribunal as
suggested in text accompanying note 56 supra, the Secretary might be relieved of
his duty.
89. The Secretary of Labor "has not been permitted to make these reports
public, and the legislative history when the Taft-Hartley law was passed in Congress
indicated clearly that these reports were to be made available only to the chairmen
of the appropriate committees of Congress, and this is what has been done." Testi-
mony of Secretary of Labor Mitchell, Subcommittee Hearings 43. See KILLINGS-
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The filing required of union officials under the bill also included all
other income and payments received from an employer. Though such
payments are illegal under Taft-Hartley, 1 the existence of other conflicts
of interests and the presence of "sweetheart" contracts 2 suggest that the
act is being ignored. The inadequacy of the Taft-Hartley remedies, which
make it criminal for employers to give payments and for union officials
to receive them, appears to lie in the difficulty of enforcing them. Unlike
normal criminal activity where there is a noticeably aggrieved victim, the
injured party in this case is the union member whose subtle injury appears,
if at all, by way of sub-standard collective bargaining. The difficulty arises
from the fact that this h o more indicates that union leaders have been
bribed than that there is inefficient union leadership or merely an inequality
of labor-management bargaining strength. The obvious purpose of filing
is to provide the heretofore unavailable means of enforcement. However,
the mere demand for a report of illegal payments provided in this bill is of
doubtful efficacy. It is unrealistic to expect that a person, undeterred by
the sanctions provided for taking the bribe, would shrink from unlawfully
failing to report it. The filing requirement would seem to take on meaning
only if it included a detailed report of all the assets and income of each
union official, instead of requiring, as the bill would have, a statement con-
sisting solely of the financial conflicts of interests in which the official might
be involved. This data would be more readily subject to check by the
federal enforcement officers. Failure to report bribes would be suggested,
for example, by a disproportion between income and reported assets or
between apparent opulence and reported financial status.
woRTir, STATE LADoR RE LATIONS Acts 100-01 (1947), commenting on a Wisconsin
statute requiring all unions acting as collective bargaining agents to provide annual
financial reports in writing to all members: "There is more logic in requiring financial
reports to members than in requiring the filing of such reports with some state
agency. .
90. S. 3974, zupra note 63, § 102. This was not provided for in the original
Kennedy Bill.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952) : "(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of
any employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce to receive or
accept, or to agree to receive or accept, from the employer of such employees any
money or other thing of value. . . . (d) Any person who willfully violates any of
the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor
and be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both." In United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956), it was held
that this section outlaws all payments, except those exempted, between employers
and representatives and is not aimed solely at welfare fund payments.
92. A sweetheart contract is one arrived at through collusion of the union and
management, containing such sub-standard provision as: "1. A wage scale of a few
cents above the legal minimum of $1 an hour, or a weekly average of $40 to $42 a
week; 2. Two to four holidays; 3. No sick leave; 4. Little or no vacation pay;
5. No welfare benefits; 6. No seniority; and 7. A promise--always fulfilled-no
enforcement." Interim Report 183. Employer justification for such contracts was
phrased in terms of "we have to make the best deal we can." Id. at 219. A variation
of this is where a sufficient contract has been negotiated but favored employers are
allowed to disregard it. IUOE officials reportedly allowed some contractors to pay
as much as $1 an hour less than the wages prescribed in the union contract. Id. at 372.
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It was argued during the senatorial debates 93 that obligatory report-
ing of criminal activity required by such reports would be an unconstitu-
tional requirement of self-incrimination. Whether such a statute would be
violative of the fifth amendment guarantees needs to be explored. The
reports required by the Kennedy-Ives Bill demand disclosure of personal
records, normally within the protection of the privilege. However, a doc-
trine has been developed by the courts to the effect that, when the legis-
lature constitutionally requires a class of persons to maintain certain rec-
ords, they may lose their private privileged character and be subject to
governmental examination even though they include material tending to
incriminate the record-keeper. Originally, this "public records" doctrine
was restricted to the records of governmental agents, 94 or persons engaged
in businesses regulated or licensed by the Government because of their
tendency to "endanger the public health, morals, or safety," 9 5 e.g., junk
dealers 96 or druggists who sold intoxicants9 7 These private entrepreneurs
were said to become "public officers" 98 by virtue of the record require-
ment. In recent years the doctrine has been extended to situations where
the activity regulated does not fall in either of the above categories. Thus
in Shapiro v. United States99 a divided Supreme Court held that records
required to be kept under regulations issued by the Office of Price Admin-
istration (as provided for in the statute) became public records; and, con-
sequently, in an action to convict petitioner of violating the regulations by
alleged tie-in sales, the records would have to be produced without resort
to the privilege against self-incrimination. Here the public danger arising
from an inflationary economy justified the regulation of the whole retail
industry; and, since the regulation treated the merchants as licensees, they
could be required to maintain records of their transactions for the infor-
mation of the Government.1 ° Employers' records required to be kept to
aid in the enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act have been held to
be similarly unprivileged.1 0 1 What may be operative in these decisions is
the notion that under modern government's mass regulation of industries,
the distinction between that which is wholly private enterprise and that
which exists solely by license of the government may no longer be limited
to those few enterprises dealing in goods of an inherently hazardous nature.
93. 104 CONG. RErC. 9849-63 (daily ed. June 12, 1958).
94. People v. Coombs, 158 N.Y. 532, 53 N.E. 527 (1899) (coroner's records).
95. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 65 (dissent of Justice Frankfurter).
96. City of St. Louis v. Baskowitz, 273 Mo. 543, 201 S.W. 870 (1919) ; State v.
Legora, 162 Tenn. 122, 34 S.W.2d 1056 (1930).
97. State v. Smith, 74 Iowa 580, 38 N.W. 709 (1888) ; State v. Donovan, 10 N.D.
203, 86 N.W. 709 (1901).
98. State v. Donovan, supra note 97.
99. 335 U.S. 1 (1947).
100. 335 U.S. at 9, 10, 11, 15.
101. Durldn v. Fisher, 204 F2d 930-32 (8th Cir. 1953). The Shapiro rule has
also been applied to records required to be kept under the Wool Products Labeling
Act. United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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The same need for effective and efficient law enforcement that the govern-
ment has in requiring recordation of sales of intoxicants by druggists
exists in relation to enforcement of other more complex business regulation.
While the limits of the Shapiro doctrine have not been indicated by the
Court, it is not to be expected that Congress will be permitted absolutely
to repeal the privilege of the fifth amendment, as applied to written docu-
ments, by the simple expedient of requiring records to be maintained by
all those who might break the law. At some point a distinction must be
made between requiring "public" records to be maintained by a regulated
industry to aid in administration of the law and a demand that certain
criminals, e.g., bank robbers, confess their antisocial conduct by periodic
reports. In United States v. Ansani I 2 one district court viewed as the
latter type a federal law which required dealers in gambling instruments
to file reports of their shipments in interstate commerce with the federal
government. As construed by the court, the filing required was exclusively
of acts expressly declared to be federal crimes. This was deemed to be
similar to a requirement that burglars periodically report their criminal
activity to the police,1°3 and was therefore held unconstitutional. On
analysis, the requirement involved in Ansani is not greatly dissimilar to that
considered in Shapiro. Although in the latter case the Government re-
quired all sales, legal and illegal, to be reported, the Government had
genuine interest only in the reported illegal conduct. If there is a valid
distinction between the cases, it may lie in the notion that in Ansani gov-
ernment regulation took the form of absolute prohibition of certain con-
duct while in Shapiro the scheme of regulation was directed towards con-
trolling the manner of performance of an essentially lawful enterprise,
in the course of which regulation certain conduct was proscribed. Such
a rationale would indicate that a requirement of filing financial reports
by union officials as part of a general scheme of regulation of labor organi-
zations in interstate commerce may not be subject to successful attack.
However, the dearth of cases and the failure of the Supreme Court to
fashion limits to the rule of Shapiro renders uncertain, at best, any attempt
to apply it to other situations.
Another possible approach, and one which would avoid this contro-
versy, would be to repeal the criminal sanctions of Taft-Hartley and re-
quire the reporting of all conflicts of interests together with financial
statements, thus making evasion more difficult. Since Congress can forbid
the basic activity, it would follow that if the criminal sanctions were
repealed filing could be required as an exercise of congressional investiga-
tive power. No valid objection to the imposition of a sanction to assure
accurate reporting could be raised since none would be imposed. The in-
formation thus obtained would then be forwarded to union members who
could vote miscreant officials from office. 104
102. 138 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ii. 1955).
103. Id. at 454.
104. See text accompanying note 86 supra for discussion of member apathy.
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VIII. MIDDLEMAN-EMPLOYERS
The Taft-Hartley Act imposed criminal penalties on an employer who
makes payments or gives things of value to any representative of his em-
ployees. 105 An employer, as defined by the act, "includes any person act-
ing as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly .... " 106 With the
passage of the act employers sought a means of avoiding the criminal penalty
by procuring the services of labor consultants. 10 7 These labor consultants,
or middlemen, acting in the interests of the employer, have allegedly been
utilized as the means through which employer payments to union officials
have been channeled.108 While there would appear to be no difficulty in
imposing criminal sanctions on an employer when a labor consultant has
perpetrated such deeds at the direction or with the knowledge or ac-
quiescence of the employer, there is some question 109 whether the employer
or labor consultant will be criminally liable should the latter make such
payment without the consent of the employer. While the NLRB and the
courts have not applied stringent standards in determining the existence of
an agency relationship when cease and desist orders against an employer
are involved," it would seem that the precepts of criminal law should
demand actual direction or acquiescence by an employer for him to be
criminally responsible. To cover cases where the labor consultant might
escape liability for improper payments to union officials, the Kennedy-Ives
Bill would have amended the Taft-Hartley Act so as to make illegal pay-
ments by labor consultants, as well as by employers."'
In dealing with employers generally the bill provided that every em-
ployer who expended more than $5,000 in the preceding fiscal year for
105. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952) : "(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay
or deliver, or to agree to pay or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any
representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting
commerce."
106. 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1952). The Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 450 (1935),
defined "Employer" to include those "acting as an agent of the employer." The
change of language in Taft-Hartley was to establish that "both employers and
labor organizations will be responsible for the acts of their agents in accordance with
the ordinary common law rules of agency." Legislative History of the LMRA,
H.R. CONFmENCE REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 (1947). However, the
test for determining the agency relationship since 1947 is virtually the same as that
previously applied. See Abercrombie Co., 83 N.L.IRB. 524 (1949).
107. It has been estimated that there are 800 such associations in New York alone,
though the vast majority are not performing acts which would be illegal if middle-
men were construed to be employers under Taft-Hartley. Subcommittee Hearings
615. The findings of the McClellan committee emphasized that many illegal union
activities would not have been possible without the assistance of certain companies
and individuals. Interim Report 86.
108. Id. at 299.
109. It has been suggested that the Taft-Hartley Act may not include the activi-
ties of middlemen. Testimony of Secretary of Labor Mitchell, Subconmittee Hear-
ings 39. See also Interim Report 452.
110. See, e.g., NLRB v. E. C. Atkins Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1946); NLRB v. New
Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.Zd 908 (8th Cir. 1954); Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106
N.L.R.B. 480, 498 (1953).
111. S. 3974, supra note 63, §608.
THE KENNEDY-IVES BILL
activities intended to influence or affect employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by section 7 of Taft-Hartley 112 must file an annual report list-
ing "any payment, directly or indirectly, of any money or other thing of
value, to any labor organization or any officer or employee of any labor
organization . *.".." 113 Middlemen who were used by such employers
were obliged also to file reports of their activities."14 Thus, an employer
would have been required to file reports of illegal payments he made, as
are union officials required to file accounts of the receipt of such payments.
The constitutional problems discussed in connection with requiring union
officials to file are similarly applicable here.
An ancillary problem involves employer payments to union officials to
prevent unionization. The Taft-Hartley Act, in only forbidding payments
to the representative of employees, has been held not to cover this situa-
tion.1115 The Kennedy-Ives Bill dealt with this problem by a clause which
made illegal payments "to any labor organization or any officer or employee
thereof which represents, seeks to represent or would admit to membership
any of the employees of such employer. 11
IX. CONCLUSION
If any criticism can be directed at the Kennedy-Ives Bill certainly its
most vulnerable feature was the failure to asseverate a basic policy. Many
features of the bill suggested a congressional reliance on voluntary union
action. Yet other provisions, notably those dealing with convicts, seemed
to be borne of an implied distrust in the efficacy of this self-regulative
force.117 The failure to provide for the creation of impartial tribunals,
proposed as an alternative to governmental supervision, further illustrates
this attitude. If this distrust is warranted, then providing, as the bill
did, for an extensive informing of the membership would prove futile
as a check on union officials. Certainly many of the bill's provisions were
creatures of inconsistent philosophies.
112. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
113. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 103. Criminal penalties were provided for non-
compliance. Id. § 107.
114. Id. § 104.
115. Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957).
116. S. 3974, supra note 63, § 603. Section 609 prohibits the receipt of payments
made illegal under § 608. Examples of such conduct were reported by the Committee,
e.g., several Flint, Michigan businessmen were picketed by the teamsters in an organi-
zation movement, but after payments to a person "in apparent collusion with teamster
officials" the pickets were withdrawn. Interim Report 299.
117. It cannot be gainsaid that there is some support for this view. For example,
in one case a court intervened to end the reign of officials who had suspended meeting
and misappropriated funds, but when an honest -election was held the same officers
were re-elected. Local 11 v. McKee, 114 N.J. Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (Ch. 1933).
However, this occurred in an era when union distrust of the protections afforded by
the judiciary was prevalent.
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The haste associated with the drafting of the bill was saliently evi-
denced by many of its provisions. To properly administer the filing de-
manded of the numerous local unions alone would necessitate a sizeable
clerical force. While Congress may deem that the necessity for acquiring
such information overrides the concomitant expense, the fact that the Senate
debates were noticeably devoid of concern over the expense and adminis-
trative burden involved suggests an inadequate consideration of the prob-
lem by the draftsmen.
The commendable feature of the proposed legislation was that in some
respects it did adopt the suggestion of self-regulation. A proper function-
ing of the interrelated filing requirements and election safeguards would
result in ending the reign of any officials whose espousal of the principles
of unionism was not supported by their deeds. The hoped-for effect will
then be that an informed membership will elect responsible officials who will
adequately fulfill the positions entrusted to them, and that self-imposed
reforms will come from within the unions. Furthermore, allowing for self-
regulation would seem to be the only practical way since it is unlikely that
Congress would wish to dictate to union members whom they may choose
to represent them. However, if voluntary union action fails to attain the
congressional objective then governmental licensing of unions and officials
may be the next step. This possibility should provide a further impetus
for unions to properly regulate themselves.
J.T.M.
